GLOBAL ECONOMY
by EURASIA
TOP RISKS 2020
Revisão_02; RAS
2020-01-14
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. COVER. Adendo by RAS.
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“Um ano
preocupante”: os 10 principais riscos para o mundo em 2020
Em relatório
divulgado nesta semana, a consultoria americana Eurasia aponta os maiores
riscos políticos e econômicos previstos para este ano
Fonte: Revista EXAME; Por Ligia Tuon;
access_time13 jan 2020, 17h10 - Publicado em 11 jan 2020, 08h00
Acesso RAS 2020-01-13
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Tempestade à vista: momento
pelo qual o mundo passa é mais propício para uma crise global, diz a EURASIA(Jules Kulcsar / EyeEm/Getty
Images)
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São Paulo — “O ano
de 2020 parece realmente preocupante”, diz o grupo EURASIA em
relatório publicado nesta semana. No documento, a consultoria americana aponta
os maiores riscos políticos e econômicos previstos para este ano, entre eles, a
relação entre Estados
Unidos e China e
o descontentamento em países da América
Latina.
No caso do Brasil, a consultoria vê como um avanço as reformas propostas pela equipe econômica, com destaque para a da Previdência, aprovada em outubro, e para a tributária, em tramitação no Congresso. Mas alerta para o risco de as medidas não se converterem no crescimento econômico esperado.
A EURASIA destaca que o
momento pelo qual o mundo passa, de deterioração das relações entre os países e
consequente redução do comércio, é mais propício para uma crise global. Ao
mesmo tempo, os recursos disponíveis para que governos e setor privado lutem
contra isso estão cada vez mais escassos.
“A economia global, depois de
ter emergido da grande recessão de 2008 com a mais longa expansão do período
pós-guerra, agora está arrefecendo. Mais economistas esperam uma recessão em
2020 ou 2021.
E o o mundo está entrando agora em uma recessão geopolítica cada vez mais profunda, com uma falta de liderança global como resultado do unilateralismo dos EUA, do declínio da Rússia, que quer minar a estabilidade e a coesão dos Estados Unidos e de seus aliados, e um crescente empoderamento da China.
E, finalmente, as mudanças climáticas, que já atrapalham o avanço econômico. Isso só vai aumentar com o tempo”, diz.
E o o mundo está entrando agora em uma recessão geopolítica cada vez mais profunda, com uma falta de liderança global como resultado do unilateralismo dos EUA, do declínio da Rússia, que quer minar a estabilidade e a coesão dos Estados Unidos e de seus aliados, e um crescente empoderamento da China.
E, finalmente, as mudanças climáticas, que já atrapalham o avanço econômico. Isso só vai aumentar com o tempo”, diz.
Esse cenário faz com que 2020
seja um ponto de inflexão na história. “O ano reúne uma combinação de fatores
negativos que não presenciamos em gerações”, diz a a consultoria.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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GLOBAL ECONOMY
EURASIA: TOP RISKS 2020 [foreword]
OVER VIEW
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. COVER. Adendo by RAS.
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2020 is a tipping point.
We’ve lived with growing levels of geopolitical risk
for nearly a decade, but without a true international crisis. Outside of
geopolitics, global trends have been strongly favorable. That’s now changing.
Globalization is key. The most important feature of
the post-war era landscape—people, ideas, goods, and capital moving faster and
faster across borders around the planet—has created extraordinary wealth and
opportunity. It’s increased global equality (even as it’s created more inequality
within many countries), reduced poverty, extended lifespans, and supported
peace and prosperity.
But with CHINA and the UNITED STATES decoupling from one another on
technology, a critical piece of the 21st-century economy is now fragmenting in
two. Countries across the developed world have become more polarized,
increasing the POWER OF TRIBALISM.
Add the shrinking of supply chains with changes in the
politics, economics, and technology of manufactured goods and services, and
suddenly globalization has a split personality. Then there are the economic and
geopolitical trends. Both are now cycling downward.
The global economy, after emerging from the great
recession of 2008 with the longest expansion of the post-war period, is now
softening. More economists expect a recession in 2020 or 2021.
And the world is now entering a deepening geopolitical
recession, with a lack of global leadership as a result of American unilateralism,
an erosion of US-led alliances, a RUSSIA
in decline that wants to undermine the stability and cohesion of both the US
and its allies, and an increasingly empowered CHINA under consolidated leadership that’s building a competitive
alternative on the global stage.
Lastly, climate change is beginning to constrain
economic growth and to matter on the global political stage as never before.
That’s only going to increase over time (unlike the cyclical economic and
geopolitical trends, which sooner or later will become more favorable). In
2020, have a combination of negative trend lines that we’ve experienced in
generations.
This deteriorating environment is much more likely to
produce a global crisis. The resources available governments and the private
sector make it easier than in past to respond. But the scale of the challenges
is greater, the geopolitical recession undermines global cooperation.
For all these
reasons, 2020 looks troubling indeed.
IAN BREMMER
President
CLIFF KUPCHAN
Chairman
Source: EURASIA REPORT 2020. COVER. Adendo by RAS.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. COVER. Adendo by RAS.
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Quoted by RAS:
Excerpt from Chapter 9:
BRAZIL is the one major economically promising country
in the [Latin America] region for 2020. President JAIR BOLSONARO, like many of his
colleagues, was elected as an outsider. He has passed landmark pension reform
legislation and is pursuing other overhauls, including on taxes.
His approval
ratings are low (44%) but stable, and he has a loyal base. But while the
Brazilian economy is trending favorably, public anger will come quickly if
current forecasts for a rebound don’t pan out.
That in turn would limit BOLSONARO’S ability to implement reforms,
potentially turning his administration toward more overt nationalism and/or
helping the return of the opposition in 2022—either way a challenge for the
region’s largest economy.
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Veja quais são
os dez riscos previstos pela firma de consultoria americana EURASIA neste ano
2020:
1 – Quem governa os EUA?
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As
instituições americanas estão entre as mais fortes e resilientes do mundo. Em
2020, no entanto, serão testadas de maneira sem precedentes, segundo a EURASIA.
Por isso, a política americana é tratada como risco pela primeira vez no
ranking.
Um
dos eventos mais relevantes do ano no país serão as eleições presidenciais de
novembro, que podem dar a DONALD TRUMP
a reeleição.
“Será o pior
clima político para uma eleição nacional que os EUA experimentam desde a
(efetivamente fracassada) eleição de 1876”, escreve a consultoria, em
referência a um pleito contestado que gerou até especulações de uma retomada da
Guerra Civil (1861-1865) e elegeu o
republicano RUTHERFORD HAYES.
TRUMP passa por um processo de
impeachment nos Estados Unidos por ter pressionado a Ucrânia a investigar o
ex-vice-presidente JOE
BIDEN, um potencial rival nas eleições de 2020. Por esse motivo, a
Eurasia acredita que muitos americanos podem achar ilegítima uma possível
vitória do republicano em novembro, levando a um descontentamento social
significativo.
Apesar
de o pedido de seu impeachment ter sido aprovado na Câmara em dezembro, é
remota a chance de passar no Senado, que tem maioria republicana.
“Em outras
palavras, a eleição de 2020 é um ‘BREXIT americano’. Trata-se de uma votação
polarizada na qual o risco é menos o resultado do que a incerteza política. É
um território desconhecido e, desta vez, em um país onde a incerteza cria ondas
de choque no exterior”, diz a consultoria.
[1]
Rigged!: Who governs the US?
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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We’ve never listed US domestic politics as the
top risk, mainly because US institutions are among the world’s strongest and
most resilient. This year, those institutions will be tested in unprecedented
ways. We face risks of a US election that many will view as illegitimate,
uncertainty in its aftermath, and a foreign policy environment made less stable
by the resulting vacuum. Institutional constraints have prevented President
Donald Trump from realizing major parts of his agenda (much as they have
presidents preceding him), but they haven’t stopped him from dividing the
nation.
Can
a country this polarized move forward?
Trump has been impeached in the House of
Representatives, and he will be acquitted by the Senate. This dynamic will
delegitimize the November presidential election. Democrats will feel
impeachment was politically quashed to place the president above the law, while
Trump will feel empowered to interfere with election outcomes, with impeachment
no longer a credible instrument of political restraint.
At the same time, there will be external
interference in US elections, especially from Russia, and the president and the
Senate will do little to minimize the damage via tighter election security
measures. In other words, we’ll have an election that—in advance—will be
perceived as “rigged” by a large percentage of the population. Public opinion
polls already show this risk is on the rise.
According to a 2019 poll by IPSOS, just 53% of
the public believed the presidential election will be fair. But the biggest
drop in confidence has come among Democratic voters. In 2016, 84% of Democrats
believed that year’s election was fair; the number fell to 39% in September
2019 when asked about this year’s election.
Legal challenges, which will likely fail in a
conservative-leaning Supreme Court, could even lead to calls from some quarters
for the vote to be postponed or boycotted, which would be unsuccessful but
further undermine electoral legitimacy.
Alternately, if Trump feels he’s likely to
lose, he could blame external actors such as Ukraine for interference and
attempt to manipulate outcomes (especially in existing but vulnerable red
states, where Trump allies hold political sway) in the name of ensuring
election security. It will be the worst political climate for a national
election that the US has experienced since the (effectively failed) election of
1876.
American
Brexit
What happens then? If Trump wins amid credible charges of
irregularities, the election process will become contested. If he loses, same.
Particularly if the vote is close, and it’s likely to be. That would lead to
lawsuits reminiscent of the Al Gore-George W. Bush election in 2000 that was
ultimately decided in the Supreme Court. But unlike Gore-Bush, it’s hard to see
a scenario in which the high court rules and the loser graciously accepts the
outcome as legitimate, especially if the loser is Trump.
In other words, the 2020 election is an American Brexit—a maximally polarized
vote where the risk is less the outcome than the political uncertainty of what
the people voted for. It’s uncharted political territory, and this time in a
country where uncertainty creates shockwaves abroad.
Once
the election is over, serious issues will emerge. If Trump wins amid credible
charges of irregularities, the election process will become contested. If he loses, same.
Meaningful (France-style) social discontent
becomes more likely in that environment, as does domestic, politically inspired
violence. Also, a non-functioning Congress, with both sides using their
positions to maximize political pressure on the eventual election outcome,
setting aside the legislative agenda. That becomes a bigger problem if the US
is entering an economic downturn, on the back of expanded spending and other
measures to juice the economy in the run-up to the election.
PET
THE DOG
The challenge extends to foreign policy as
well, because any decisions Trump makes on security or trade questions in that
environment would be viewed as lacking authority. Enemies will see the US
presidency as the weakest it’s been since Richard Nixon was embroiled in Watergate,
and this time, there’s no Henry Kissinger.
Reckless pursuit of diplomacy is safer than
reckless pursuit of war— Trump’s preference is to “pet the dog” rather than
“wag it” (making bad deals with foreign governments rather than launching
attacks on them)—but that still means unprecedented efforts by Trump to align
US policy with the interests of antagonists and frenemies such as Russia and
Turkey.
Meanwhile, with allies and partners, Trump’s
policies coupled with turmoil in Washington will confuse and further
destabilize longstanding relationships, with big question marks over countries
that already feel particularly exposed: think South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and
Saudi Arabia. And Trump is also more inclined to miscalculate (and increasingly
unconstrained by advisers when he does so), making tail risks around those
geopolitical confrontations that occur more unpredictable (see Iran) … and
dangerous.
More broadly, both US allies and enemies over
the past years have come to wonder whether the United States intends to
lead—and they’ve hedged their bets accordingly. In the midst of a disputed 2020
election, many of those countries will wonder whether the US can govern itself.
It’s a period of unusual geopolitical vulnerability to shock and escalation.
To be clear, we’re not worried about the
long-term durability of US political institutions. The United States doesn’t
face the danger of losing its democracy in 2020. Nor are we as alarmed as the
markets about a “lurch to the left” in US policy—a Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth
Warren presidency remains plausible but unlikely; and more importantly, the
next president will face the same congressional and other institutional
constraints Trump has (though please see risk #4 on the broader pushback
against multinationals).
But a broken impeachment mechanism, questions
of electoral illegitimacy, and a series of court challenges will make this the
most volatile year of politics the US has experienced in generations.
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2 – A grande dissociação
EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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A EURASIA considera que a disputa entre
Estados Unidos e da China na esfera tecnológica pode, sozinha, gerar os mais
relevantes impactos geopolíticos na globalização desde o colapso da União
Soviética.
Essa
disputa é chamada pela consultoria de “grande dissociação” e tem potencial para
influenciar não só o mercado global de tecnologia — estimado em US$ 5 trilhões
— mas uma série de outras indústrias e instituições: da mídia e do
entretenimento às pesquisas acadêmicas.
As
duas maiores economias do mundo devem continuar usando ferramentas econômicas
nessa luta, como sanções, controle de exportações e boicotes. E “vai ficar mais
difícil para outros países não serem pegos pelo fogo cruzado”, diz a
consultoria.
[2] The Great Decoupling
De-Cou-Ple (verb)
gerund or present participle: decoupling
separate, disengage, or dissociate (something) from
something else.
Português.
1. dissociação
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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The decision by China and the United States to
decouple in the technology sphere is the single most impactful geopolitical
development for globalization since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
After
a series of escalatory US policy moves in 2019, Beijing has concluded that
decoupling is inevitable.
Caught off-guard by US actions, President Xi
Jinping has called for a new “Long March” to break China’s technological
dependence on the US. At the same time, China will expand efforts to reshape
international technology, trade, and financial architecture to better promote
its interests in an increasingly bifurcated world.
Decoupling
will affect not just the entire $5 trillion global tech sector, but a host of
other industries and institutions from media and entertainment to academic
research.
This decoupling, already disrupting beneficial
flows of technology, talent, and investment between the two countries, will
move beyond the handful of strategic technology sectors at the heart of the
US-China dispute (semiconductors, cloud computing, and 5G) into a broader array
of economic activity. It will affect not just the entire $5 trillion global
tech sector, but a host of other industries and institutions from media and
entertainment to academic research, creating a hard-to-reverse business,
economic, and cultural divide.
In the tech sector, Xi’s focus on building “resilient supply chains” will raise the
stakes of the US-China technology competition. That’s bad news for US tech
companies with big China footprints. Huawei
has already started manufacturing base stations that will power next-generation
5G mobile networks that it says do not contain US-sourced technology, and this
process of the US and China “designing out” each other’s technologies will
continue. Huawei and other Chinese
companies will also develop alternative software ecosystems, chipping away at
US leadership in mobile operating systems and enterprise software.
Markets are braced for tougher controls on US
technology exports to China and the use of Chinese components in IT systems
that help run US critical infrastructure. But they’re not prepared for the
effects of China’s response, a dramatic increase in support for indigenous
innovation through initiatives such as its new $29 billion national
semiconductor fund and its effort to foster the creation of a new Silicon Valley in the sprawling
100-million person Greater Bay Area
in southern China (including Hong Kong,
but that’s another story).
The
big question: Where will the new virtual Berlin Wall go up? Which side will
countries choose?
Taiwan will take on increased strategic importance to China as a key source of
non-US-origin equipment, especially the cutting-edge semiconductors that
Chinese companies such as Huawei rely on to compete at the global cutting edge.
South Korea will increasingly tilt toward China for the same reason.
The shift toward China will be most palpable in
Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, eastern Europe, and Latin America, in that
order. Countries in all these regions will become battlegrounds where the US
and China compete to decide who will supply consumers with tools to navigate
the 21st-century economy—not just smartphones and the networks that power them,
but mobile payments, e-commerce, and
financial services, too.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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Lastly, both the US and China have demonstrated
they’re willing to weaponize global trade and supply chains. For the US, this
includes the export ban on Huawei and other Chinese tech companies. For China,
it includes blocking imports from trade partners involved in foreign-policy
disputes with Beijing (for example,
Canada and its canola exports).
When the two largest economies politicize their
most important trading relationships, innovation and supply chain systems
become more regional and less global. As the rifts widen, they’ll risk becoming
permanent, casting a geopolitical chill over global business.
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3 – Tensão entre EUA e China
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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Um
dos agravantes dessa tensão pode ser a alta probabilidade de reeleição da
presidente de Taiwan, TSAI ING-WEN.
A líder não tem a amizade de Pequim [BEIJING] por ser uma defensora da
democracia na região, o que a coloca, automaticamente, como aliada americana.
De
qualquer forma, os Estados Unidos não devem perder a chance de reafirmar seu
apoio militar ao regime de TSAI, o
que tende a incomodar o governo chinês, que vê isso como interferência nos seus
assuntos domésticos.
O
que vem como consequência disso, segundo o relatório, seriam medidas duras
tomadas pelos EUA contra a China, incluindo sanções financeiras, controle
tecnológico e esforços para limitar o fluxo cambial americano a empresas chinesas. Essas medidas, por sua vez, teriam o
revide do país asiático.
[3] US/China
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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As this decoupling occurs, US-China tensions will lead to a more
explicit clash over national security, influence, and values. The two sides
will continue to use economic tools in this struggle—sanctions, export
controls, and boycotts—with shorter fuses and goals that are more explicitly
political.
Companies and other governments will find it harder to avoid being
caught in the crossfire. This struggle has hard-edged realism—great power
rivalry—at its core. It’s not yet as starkly ideological as the classic Cold
War formulation of capitalism vs. socialism. But as tensions escalate,
divergences between the two countries’ political structures are bringing
irreconcilable differences to the fore. The US-China rivalry will increasingly
be waged as a clash of values and animated by patriotic fervor.
The United States sees China as a repressive regime that will use its
economic clout to punish its foes and limit criticism from overseas, as we saw
in the snap NBA boycott in response to an executive’s tweet in support of
pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong. China sees the United States as a
hegemon that wants to stunt the growth of, and sow division within, its rival,
a narrative that Xi has used to
enhance the Communist Party’s legitimacy and his own consolidation of power.
The trade war has been fought to a standstill and won’t go away, with a
truce in place but little chance of a breakthrough. The US foreign policy
establishment is focused on how to contain China rather than compete with it,
amplifying bilateral tensions. China-bashing will feature prominently in the US
presidential campaign, and an already China-skeptical Trump will have mixed
intentions and limited capacity to stop his administration from taking tough
action against China on national security and foreign policy issues.
Furthermore, Hong Kong’s political crisis will persist, while Taiwan’s
January 2020 vote will likely see a reelection of Beijing’s foe Tsai Ing-wen,
bolstered by stronger nationalist sentiment within the population. The United
States will emphasize military and diplomatic support for Tsai’s regime and at
least moral support for Hong Kong’s protesters (driven by Congress), prompting
angry objections from Beijing over interference in its domestic affairs.
As a consequence, the US will take tough measures against China, including
financial sanctions (over Xinjiang, Iran, Hong Kong), designation of officials,
technology controls, and efforts to limit US capital flowing to Chinese firms.
These actions will also create tail risks for an already softening Chinese
economy. Meanwhile, China will punish US and other foreign firms viewed as
supporting Washington’s “containment agenda.” The “unreliable entities” list
will grow longer, and China will continue to restrict space for foreigners by
reducing their ability to get visas. The politicization of China’s economic
relationships will intensify as Beijing looks for ideological “outlets” to vent
over an aggressive Washington and slowing economic growth at home.
Meanwhile, as Trump faces a challenging reelection campaign, Xi may test
Trump’s willingness to push back aggressively in areas such as Hong Kong and
Taiwan, sensing that while trade matters for Trump, he is less interested in
security questions. That’s dangerous, because the US president is
unpredictable.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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4 – Não conte com a ajuda
das multinacionais
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME.
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Num
cenário em que as tensões internacionais deixam o mundo cada vez mais à deriva,
sem poder contar com a liderança de órgãos como o G-20,
que reúne as economias mais desenvolvidas do mundo, muitos esperam que o setor
privado possa ocupar essa lacuna na governança global, principalmente em áreas
como mudança climática, alívio da pobreza e até comércio e liberalização do
investimento.
“Nós
somos céticos. Especialmente porque as empresas devem enfrentar neste ano mais
conflitos no que diz respeito à regulação e ao ambiente geopolítico”, diz a
consultoria.
Em
outras palavras, não conte com as multinacionais, pois elas estarão “ocupadas”
lutando contra pressões regulatórias vindas de movimentos populistas
anti-comércio, particularmente em mercados desenvolvidos.
“Acordos
multilaterais de livre comércio deram chances às multinacionais de alavancarem
seus negócios e reduzirem pressões regulatórias, suavizando custos
de compliance. Não deve ser assim em 2020, com os governos buscando
acordos bilaterais que sejam produtivos isoladamente”, diz o relatório.
[4] MNCs
not to the rescue!
Many
observers believe multinational corporations (MNCs) will fill the gaps in
global governance and the liberal order left by the G-Zero world.
Specifically, the private sector will step in
to lead in areas such as climate change, poverty relief, and even trade and
investment liberalization. We’re skeptical. Especially as corporates face a
significantly more confrontational regulatory and geopolitical environment in
the year ahead.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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Since
World War II, US-led globalization has been a BOON for MNCs, as it expanded and entrenched
global supply chains based on cheap labor and resource inputs from around the
world.
Note by RAS: Boon (noun)
1. a thing that is helpful or beneficial.
They now account for more than 50% of global
trade, one-third of global output, and about one-quarter of global employment.
MNCs have become influential political actors as governments shaped global
trade, regulatory, and tax regimes in their favor. And the firms have in turn
exerted influence on policy.
Markets overseas where MNCs from the United
States invest in manufacturing receive lower tariff rates from the US
government. So too, World Bank projects involving MNCs are more likely to get
better financing terms because of their ability to influence the bank’s largest
governmental backers.
But today, nation-states are
reasserting themselves, presenting new risks to the capital and assets of
corporations. Structural factors motivate governments:
i.
slowing global
growth,
ii.
widening
socioeconomic disparity,
iii.
rising populism and
nationalism, and
iv.
tech competition
between the United States and China that makes trade riskier.
In the European Union, governments are turning to industrial policies to
promote domestic firms and counter China’s statist approach. In the United
States, regulating “BIG TECH” is an
increasingly prominent idea in politics. US national security officials are
pushing to protect critical infrastructure and limit foreign investment,
including from third-country firms.
They are also attempting to compel Western corporates to embrace a
Washington-centric view of “trusted vendors”
and ownership transparency as part of broader efforts to curtail US market
opportunities for Chinese firms. And even as a divided US Congress stalls
changes in some areas, individual states are increasingly regulating on issues
from privacy to antitrust.
In China, decoupling from the United States translates into more
aggressive industrial subsidies in the high-tech arena, from electric vehicles
to semiconductors.
It’s not just the “move fast and break things” tech firms that face
elevated risk. In years past, companies succeeded in “capturing” state
institutions to forestall or diminish unfavorable regulations. In the US, firms
spent $3.5 billion on corporate lobbying in 2018 and were on track for a
similar amount in 2019—up from $1.5 billion in 1998.
They will face backlash to these efforts from rising anti-trade populist
movements, particularly in developed markets. A win for a further-left
candidate such as Sanders or Warren is not our basecase in the US, but the
resonance of their economic message will influence more centrist policy
thinking on issues such as regulating the private equity industry, enforcing
antitrust policies, and controlling pharmaceutical pricing. Both sides of the
political aisle recognize the salience of anti-corporate sentiment—a recurring
theme for Trump and part of his campaign message in 2016.
Multilateral free trade agreements once gave MNCs leverage to reduce
regulatory pressures, or at least make regulation consistent across many
markets, smoothing compliance costs. No longer in 2020, as governments instead
pursue bilateral agreements that are productive in isolation but create new
inconsistencies in global regulations and tariff rates.
New regulatory risks will strain corporate reputations and make public
and government affairs management more difficult. Government affairs will need
to be more involved in strategy and boards more conversant on policy and
regulatory risk. Companies can’t be all things to all people. They will
maximize gains in areas where regulatory pressures align with their core
business models (think Apple on data privacy and Tesla on sustainability) while
minimizing risks of fallout elsewhere.
The ability of MNCs to generate wealth, growth, and jobs will take a
hit. Shareholders will need to adjust expectations. Nation-state pushback comes
at a time when earnings projections for next year are already buffeted by
geopolitical risk. Investors are balancing the potential for an easing of
US-China tariffs against forced technological decoupling and softer economic
growth projections in the world’s biggest markets. Increasing and more
disparate regulatory demands from national governments will add to transaction
costs and put further pressure on profits. Data privacy policies in Europe, a
digital tax push in the OECD, and an “unreliable entities” list in China are
just the beginning of the list of challenges.
And so MNCs won’t be as much help with global governance or supporting
the global order. Given new headwinds, most will need even sharper focus on
their bottom lines. Yet another driver of
the G-Zero world.
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5
-Influência de Modi na Índia
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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Os
impactos das políticas sociais controversas do segundo mandato do
primeiro-ministro indiano NARENDRA
MODI devem ser sentidos em 2020, segundo a Eurasia. Medidas recentes
anunciadas pelo líder, reeleito em maio do ano passado, beneficiam a cultura
hindu em detrimento da muçulmana.
Em
dezembro, parlamentares indianos aprovaram uma lei que garante cidadania a
pessoas do Paquistão, Bangladesh e
Afeganistão residentes no país – desde que não sejam muçulmanas. Há cerca de 200 milhões de muçulmanos
vivendo na Índia.
Mais
cedo, em outubro, o primeiro-ministro anunciou a divisão do estado de Jammu e
Caxemira e tirou da região, de maioria muçulmana, o status de estado.
Esse
foco na agenda social terá efeitos prejudiciais para a política externa da
Índia, prevê a EURASIA.
“Suas
ações em direitos humanos estarão sob escrutínio mais minucioso por muitas
nações, e sua reputação será atingida. Relações da Índia com os EUA enfrentarão
um desafio em 2020. Alguns membros do Congresso dos EUA estão preocupados com
as políticas da Índia em geral, e em particular com seus planos de comprar o
sistema de defesa antimísseis S-400 da Rússia. O Congresso poderia impor
sanções”, diz o relatório.
A
situação fiscal da Índia é precária, alerta a Eurasia, pois o governo enfrenta
um déficit fiscal crescente, marcado pelo baixo desempenho do imposto sobre
bens e serviços estabelecido no primeiro mandato de Modi.
“Uma
economia enfraquecida, por sua vez, alimentará nacionalismos e protecionismos,
pesando sobre o país em 2020”, diz.
[5] India
gets Modi-fied
Prime Minister NARENDRA MODI has spent much of his second term promoting
controversial social policies at the expense of an economic agenda. The impacts
will be felt in 2020, with intensified communal and sectarian instability, as
well as foreign policy and economic setbacks.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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MODI and his government have been busy in recent months. They revoked the
special status for Jammu and Kashmir and implemented a system to
identify illegal immigrants in the northeast, stripping 1.9 million people of
citizenship. The government also passed a law that, for the first time, makes
religion a criterion for migrants from neighboring countries to formally
acquire Indian citizenship. Behind these moves is AMIT SHAH, the former head of MODI’s
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), now home minister.
Sectarian and religious conflict will grow
accordingly. Kashmir is a powder keg, with political leaders still under arrest
and internet access cut off. Protests have already spread around India as many
citizens fear the loss of India’s secular identity. The government’s harsh
response, in turn, will provoke still more demonstrations. But MODI will not back down, and as the
government pursues its new agenda, state-level opposition leaders will directly
challenge the central government.
This focus on the social agenda will also have
harmful effects for India’s foreign policy. Its actions on human rights will be
under closer scrutiny by many nations, and its reputation will take a hit.
India’s relations with the US, which have been a bright spot under MODI, will face a challenge in 2020.
Some members of the US Congress are concerned with India’s policies generally,
and in particular with its plans to buy
the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. Congress could impose
sanctions. At the least, the anti-missile system purchase will impede further
sales of US military equipment to India, the strongest plank of the bilateral
relationship.
The economic spillover is also noteworthy. The
social agenda has empowered a key part of MODI’s
base, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS)—Hindu nationalists who oppose market opening and support economic
nationalism. The RSS is the ideological parent to MODI’s BJP and helped ensure his reelection. An empowered RSS means
that MODI has less room to maneuver
on structural reforms, just as the economy is starting to sputter, with
quarterly growth falling to a six-year low of 4.5% and forward-looking
indicators looking softer still. The RSS influence was evident in MODI’s decision to drop out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
negotiations last year and will be a big reason why India is unlikely to rejoin
in 2020.
India’s fiscal situation is
also precarious, as the government faces a widening fiscal deficit, marked by
the underperformance of the goods and services tax. A weakened economy will in
turn feed further economic nationalism and protectionism, weighing on India’s
troubled course in 2020.
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6 – Europa
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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A União
Europeia (UE) estaria sendo ingênua em esperar que seus principais
parceiros comerciais sigam as regras do jogo?
Grandes
líderes da região, a presidente da comissão executiva da UE, URSULA VON DER LEYEN, e o presidente
francês, EMMANUEL MACRON (foto
acima), pensam que sim. Essa postura pode fazer com que o bloco, que costumava
se alinhar aos interesses de Washington, mude de posição mais vezes.
No
setor de regulamentação, essa postura vem sendo vista na luta do bloco contra
gigantes norte-americanos de tecnologia, por meio da utilização inovadora da
legislação local.
Já
no comércio, a opinião da Eurasia é de que a UE levará abordagens mais
assertivas a novas áreas, por exemplo, tornando o cumprimento do acordo
climático de Paris uma condição para novos negócios.
A
opinião da consultoria é que, apesar de não estar interessado em manter um
exército próprio europeu, o bloco tomará medidas para usar o maior mercado
interno do mundo para quebrar barreiras às trocas militares e tecnológicas.
Isso pode ser visto como uma afronta pelos EUA, especialmente porque poucos
países europeus cumpriram suas promessas na OTAN em gastos com defesa.
[6] Geopolitical Europe
For
years, Europe has talked a big game about charting its own course on foreign
and trade policy. So far, it has proven unable or unwilling to effectively push
back where it disagreed with Washington or, increasingly, Beijing. This is
about to change.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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The new leadership of the European Commission
and the European Union’s most powerful leader at present, French President EMMANUEL MACRON, share a sober view of
world affairs. They think the EU has been naive in expecting its main
commercial partners to play by the rules and want to equip themselves to react
to unfair practices and anticipate further unilateral decisions. European
Commission President URSULA VON DER
LEYEN and MACRON believe the EU
should be “the guardian of multilateralism.” That such principles are under
attack has convinced VON DER LEYEN that
the EU should actively defend itself against competing economic and political
models.
On REGULATION,
the European Union’s top antitrust official, MARGRETHE VESTAGER, is battling North American tech giants through
the innovative use of EU state-aid law to question their tax arrangements.
On TRADE,
the EU will bring this more assertive approach to new areas, for instance by
making compliance with the Paris climate agreement a condition for new deals
and by retaliating in kind against punitive tariffs. Member states and the
commission are also putting pressure on China to level the playing field on
procurement, with the threat of using new “international procurement
instruments” against Chinese firms if European firms don’t get improved access
to the Chinese market.
On military matters, the EU is not about to
stand its own continental army, but it will take steps toward using the world’s
largest internal market to break down cross-border barriers to military trade
and technological development. Seen from the US, this will be an affront,
especially since few European capitals have fulfilled their NATO promises on defense
spending.
The Map: Chinese
FDI into the EU by country, cumulative 2000-2018 % of 2018
Source: Rhodium Group 0.0 7.0
Note by RAS: A FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)
is an investment in the form of a controlling
ownership in a business in one country by an entity based in
another country. It is thus distinguished from a foreign portfolio investment by a notion of direct control.
The origin of the
investment does not impact the definition, as an FDI: the investment may be
made either "inorganically" by buying a company in the target country
or "organically" by expanding the operations of an existing business
in that country. [source: Wikipedia]
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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This more independent Europe creates risks with
the United States. Washington could lash out at Brussels, especially because
Trump is no supporter of the European Union. Retaliatory tariffs are no longer
taboo, and a Europe-wide digital tax could provoke punitive tariffs on some of
Europe’s more export-driven sectors, such as automobiles and consumer goods.
Data sharing is also at risk. There is growing concern about the EU becoming
too aggressive in pushing its regulatory lead, particularly via the so-far
successful General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). As the European Union takes on US tech giants, the
United States is likely to pursue a more aggressive approach to countering the
GDPR.
A more geopolitically active EU will also
create more tension with Beijing. To date, China has achieved many of its goals
in Europe: Firms are still welcome to invest in infrastructure and wariness of
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has yet to
spread to most member states. But Beijing fears that MACRON will push for more binding EU-wide screening of BRI projects. A tougher EU stance on antidumping
will exacerbate tensions.
EU-China friction over issues such as Xinjiang
and the South China Sea will intensify. Much as China insists that the world
accept One China, Two Systems,
a more geopolitical Europe will try to insist that China accept One System, 28 States. That’s not going to sit well
in Beijing.
7 – Política x economia da mudança climática
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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O
mundo falhou em atingir a meta perseguida por dezenas de países, quando
assinaram, há cinco anos, o acordo de Paris, no qual se comprometiam a adotar
medidas que limitasse o aquecimento global a 2º Celsius até o final do século.
“Este
ano, esse fracasso levará a decisões corporativas ruins, interrupções
operacionais dos negócios e instabilidade política”, diz a EURASIA. Atualmente, o mundo está no ritmo de um aquecimento de 3,5
graus no período.
[7] Politics vs. economics of climate change
The
politics of climate change aren’t working. Dozens of countries signed on to the
Paris agreement five years ago to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius by the end
of the century. But nation-states have to date failed to implement policies
that come close to achieving that goal. This year that failure will lead to
suboptimal corporate decisionmaking, operational business disruptions, and
political instability.
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Adendo by RAS.
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The world is currently on pace for a 3.5-degree
warming. The world’s largest emitter, China, is on a 3-degree path and
unwilling to compromise economic growth ambitions on the necessary scale. The
US is on a 4-degree pathway that’s hard to reverse, no matter who wins the November
election. That leaves India as the only country among the top three polluters
with a national plan consistent with 2 degrees, though India is already falling
behind its targets.
Even countries whose political leaders have
ambitious climate plans won’t have it easy. Some will face an antielite
backlash to climate action, as we’ve seen in France. Others will struggle to
meet existing high-bar targets, as in Germany. In the United States, any
Democrat running for president will be a “dark green” environmentalist seeking
ambitious change—but even if a Democrat defeats Trump in November, progressive
climate action will face high legal, regulatory, and political hurdles in 2021
and beyond.
That puts politics on a collision course with a
growing percentage of investors, companies, and society at large, which will
carry higher costs this year.
Corporate decision-making will face a squeeze.
Over onethird of global capital has some type of environmental, social, and
corporate governance (ESG) mandate, and trillions of dollars in investment
already exclude companies and countries that won’t meet the 2-degree threshold.
Faced with shareholder activism and pressure from their own employees, and
looking to seize business opportunities that arise from becoming more
sustainable, more than 600 global companies have committed to reducing their
emissions consistent with 2 degrees. C-suites will feel they have to choose
between aggressive ESG mandates and their bottom lines.
Social pressure will create more costly
operational and investment-flow disruptions. Civil society will press investors
and companies it believes are moving too slowly—particularly oil and gas firms,
airlines, carmakers, and meat producers—a trend led by growing grass roots
movements such as Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for Future.
Related supply chain disruption will become a
meaningful risk. In turn, investors will reduce exposures to carbon intensive
industries—including critical sectors such as steel and cement—impacting asset
prices.
There’s also a growing risk of public unrest
over climate, with increasingly dangerous actions being taken by protesters.
Opposition to cuts in fuel subsidies/higher prices will have a direct impact on
climate policy and also trigger heavy-handed responses from governments that
could push protests out of control.
All of which is happening as a warming planet
makes natural disasters more frequent and more severe. For the first time in
history, the Anthropecene is itself creating economic constraints on globalization.
That requires mention on any global risks list going forward.
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8 – Conflitos no Oriente Médio
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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A política dos EUA em relação
às principais nações lideradas pelos xiitas no Oriente
Médio está falhando, segundo a Eurasia. “Isso cria riscos significativos
para a estabilidade regional, incluindo um conflito letal com o Irã e pressões
crescentes no preço do petróleo”, diz em relatório.
O assassinato do general QASEM SOLEIMANI, comandante da Força
Quds da Guarda Revolucionária iraniana, ordenado por TRUMP escalou as tensões já significativas entre EUA e Irã no dia 2
de janeiro.
O risco aparece em oitavo
lugar na lista, segundo a EURASIA,
por conta de “fortes pressões estruturais contra uma guerra”.
[8] Shia
crescendo
US
policy toward the major Shia-led nations in the Middle East is failing. That
creates significant risks for regional stability, including a lethal conflict
with Iran; upward pressure on oil prices; an Iraqi state that is either in
Iran’s orbit or failing; and a rogue Syria fused to Moscow and Tehran.
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The 2 January killing of Qods force chief QASSEM SULEIMANI, ordered by TRUMP, escalated already significant
US-Iran tensions. This is a #8 risk, not higher, because of strong structural
pressures against a major war (see red herring #1). Iran is a committed adversary
of the United States but also has a clear understanding of US military power …
as well as (now) a better sense of Trump’s red lines and deterrence capacity.
Iran further has a history of backing down in the face of an overwhelming
military threat.
For his part, Trump still seeks to avoid
large-scale military entanglements on his watch, especially as the election
campaign gears up. But the US-Iran relationship will be deadly and
geopolitically destabilizing. Lethal skirmishes in Iraq between US and Iranian
forces are likely. Iran will continue to disrupt tanker traffic in the Gulf.
Tehran also has a penchant for hitting
adversaries in unpredictable, asymmetric ways, including through its robust
offensive cyber capabilities and proxy network across the region with the
capacity to target the citizens and assets of the United States and its allies.
A more dangerous if still limited US-Iran
regional conflict is less likely but possible. Iran tensions will put a minimum
of a $5-$10 premium into the oil price this year and increase volatility.
In Iraq, the United States is on its way to
persona non grata status, which will leave more running room for an already
influential Tehran. US bombings and the SULEIMANI
killing have alienated much of the Shia Iraqi political class. The chance is
rising that the government will expel US troops this year. While the US is
losing big, Iran is only a relative winner, as protests over poor social
services and corruption were also focused on Iranian interference. This popular
discontent has outsized importance for the region, as it will strain if not
break the fibers of the Iraqi state—OPEC’s second-largest oil producer.
Finally,
Syria. The US is still a player if it keeps troops in
the energy-rich east of the country (though a withdrawal of US forces from Iraq
would undermine US supply chains, intelligence, and operational support). But
it’s played a poor hand; in fact, neither Barack Obama nor Trump has had a
coherent Syria policy. Vladimir Putin won the war with help from Tehran. The
outcome has led to increased Russian prestige and influence, especially in the
Middle East. Significant sway for a country with a poor human rights record and
a tradition of hacking into other nations’ affairs is not stabilizing.
Meanwhile, Iran’s interest in Syria is about a land-bridge to Hizbullah, not
improving the lives of the population.
Feckless US policy in Iran, Iraq, and Syria
will drive regional risk in 2020, to the detriment of the regional political
and economic order.
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9 – Descontentamento na América Latina
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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O
descontentamento da população latino-americana mantém o risco de instabilidade
política na região. As queixas dos eleitores incluem crescimento econômico
lento, corrupção e serviços públicos de baixa qualidade.
Um ponto que dificulta acordos, segundo o relatório, é o fato de as sociedades estarem profundamente polarizadas.
Um ponto que dificulta acordos, segundo o relatório, é o fato de as sociedades estarem profundamente polarizadas.
“Esse
descontentamento reduz a capacidade dos governos de colocar em prática medidas
necessária de ajuste fiscal.
Ao mesmo tempo, o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e investidores pressionarão por prudência fiscal, mas os governos em toda a região responderão sem entusiasmo. Essas pressões gerarão riscos na América Latina: protestos ocorrerão, saldos fiscais se deteriorarão, resultados de eleições serão menos previsíveis, populistas e políticos oposicionistas ficarão mais fortes”, diz.
Ao mesmo tempo, o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e investidores pressionarão por prudência fiscal, mas os governos em toda a região responderão sem entusiasmo. Essas pressões gerarão riscos na América Latina: protestos ocorrerão, saldos fiscais se deteriorarão, resultados de eleições serão menos previsíveis, populistas e políticos oposicionistas ficarão mais fortes”, diz.
Entre
seus pares, o Brasil é colocado pela Eurasia como “economicamente promissor”:
“Bolsonaro conseguiu aprovar a reforma previdenciária, marco histórico para o
país, e segue atuando para aprovar novas reformas, inclusive nos impostos”. O
clima no Brasil pode virar, porém, se as mudanças que estão sendo implementadas
atrasarem ou não forem convertidas em melhora econômica para a população.
“Isso,
por sua vez, limitaria a capacidade de Bolsonaro de implementar reformas,
potencialmente transformando sua administração em direção a um nacionalismo
mais aberto e/ou ajudando a fortalecer a oposição em 2022. De qualquer forma,
um desafio para a maior economia da região”.
[9] Discontent in Latin America
Public
anger will keep the risk of political instability high across the region. Voter
complaints include sluggish growth, corruption, and low-quality public
services. Even worse for governments, new and vulnerable middle classes want
more spending on social services, and Latin American societies are deeply
polarized.
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This discontent reduces governments’ ability to
undertake needed austerity measures. The IMF and investors will press for
fiscal prudence, but governments across the region will respond half-heartedly.
These pressures will generate risks across Latin America: Protests will occur,
fiscal balances will deteriorate, election
outcomes will be less predictable, populist and antiestablishment politicians
will grow stronger, and sentiment will worsen.
The election of right-wing presidents in
Argentina (2015), Brazil (2018), Colombia (2018), Chile (2017), and Ecuador
(2017) has proven to be a backlash against incumbents and political
establishments rather than an endorsement of market reforms.
And examples abound of popular discontent
leading to market-negative political change. In Argentina, President ALBERTO
FERNANDEZ was elected by angry and hurting voters. He will increase state
intervention and try to boost growth by abandoning fiscal and monetary
prudence. Negotiations with private creditors and the IMF will be contentious. FERNANDEZ will try to minimize debt
repayments during his term, and he’ll balk at implementing pension and labor
reforms.
In Ecuador,
an angry electorate forced President LENIN
MORENO to back down from a fuel price hike he negotiated with the IMF,
leaving him severely weakened. He’ll struggle to cut spending or raise
additional revenue, putting pressure on the fiscal balance and the IMF program.
These developments heighten the likelihood that a populist candidate will
emerge ahead of the 2021 elections.
Colombian President IVAN DUQUE will
struggle to maintain fiscal stability. Eighteen months into a four-year term,
his approval rating stands at 24%. Without a majority in Congress and facing
growing pressure from the streets, DUQUE
will fail to pass meaningful structural reforms, and voter discontent will
grow.
Public anger and protests in Chile forced President SEBASTIAN PINERA to dramatically ramp
up social spending and start the process of rewriting the constitution in 2019.
The unrest was the result of deep-seated discontent with the status quo.
Constitutional changes will hurt the economy by triggering higher spending,
more regulation, and persistent uncertainty over the substance of the changes.
In Mexico,
President ANDRES MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR
remains popular, but his promise to maintain fiscal stability while increasing
spending will be difficult to maintain. He’s committed to boosting social and
infrastructure spending while grappling with a slowing economy and lower oil
production. Lopez OBRADOR will push
through austerity measures and raise taxes, but these won’t be enough. Security
conditions will worsen.
BRAZIL
is the one major economically promising country in the region for 2020. President JAIR BOLSONARO,
like many of his colleagues, was elected as an outsider. He has passed landmark
pension reform legislation and is pursuing other overhauls, including on taxes.
His approval ratings are low (44%) but stable, and he has a loyal base. But
while the Brazilian economy is trending favorably, public anger will come
quickly if current forecasts for a rebound don’t pan out. That in turn would
limit BOLSONARO’S ability to
implement reforms, potentially turning his administration toward more overt
nationalism and/or helping the return of the opposition in 2022—either way a
challenge for the region’s largest economy
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10 – Turquia
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EURASIA REPORT 2020. Revista EXAME
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O
Presidente RECEP
TAYYIP ERDOGAN (foto) entrou em um período de declínio político e
queda de popularidade, sobretudo entre os mais jovens. Este ano, porém, sua
fraqueza o levará a atacar, prevê a Eurasia.
Erdogan
tem uma longa história de comportamento provocativo em respostas a ameaças,
provocando confronto com estrangeiros e críticos residentes na Turquia. Para a
consultoria, sua resposta danificará ainda mais a economia turca, que já está
em dificuldades.
São
previstos para este ano atritos sobretudo com os Estados Unidos. No primeiro
semestre, entram em vigor sanções aprovadas pelo congresso norte-americano
contra o país, o que deve comprometer tanto a reputação turca quanto o ambiente
de investimentos no país.
As
medidas incluem a redução nas vendas no setor militar para a Turquia, além de
ações contra alguns oficiais turcos.
Está
previsto para este ano também o julgamento do banco turco Halkbank em Nova York. “Isso poderia resultar em uma
multa de bilhões de dólares e quase certamente envolverá a revelação de
detalhes embaraçosos sobre Erdogan ou aqueles ao seu redor”, diz a Eurasia. O
banco teria auxiliado o Irã a escapar de sanções dos EUA.
As
reações de Erdogan na esfera econômica poderão criar um novo conjunto de riscos
para o país, à medida que as sanções pressionarem a economia.
“Erdogan
pode usar meios não convencionais para defender a moeda, o que pode sair pela
culatra e prejudicar a confiança dos investidores. O presidente tende a ordenar
que os bancos estatais intervenham no mercado com vendas de moedas
estrangeiras.
A Turquia enfrenta um risco significativo de controle de capital este ano”, diz o relatório.
A Turquia enfrenta um risco significativo de controle de capital este ano”, diz o relatório.
[10] Turkey
President RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN
has entered a period of steep political decline. Erdogan has a long history of
provocative behavior in response to threats, sparking confrontation with both
foreign and domestic critics. This year, his weakness will lead him to lash
out. The response will further damage Turkey’s already ailing economy.
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It’s in the arena of foreign policy, especially relations with the
United States, that Turkey will fall to new lows. US congressional sanctions
will likely take effect in the first half of this year, undermining the
country’s reputation and investment climate for corporates and putting further
pressure on the lira. Measures will include a mandatory reduction in military
sales to Turkey and actions against some Turkish officials. In addition, the
trial of Halkbank in New York state will pose major financial risks. It could
result in a fine of billions of dollars and will almost certainly involve the
release of embarrassing details about Erdogan or those around him.
On the political front, Erdogan’s popularity is slipping, especially
among young people, and his ruling coalition is shaky. The president is
suffering defections from the ruling Justice and Development Party. Popular
former party officials are in the process of establishing two new political
movements. The partnership with the Nationalist Movement Party may not last
given the poor health of its leader.
ERDOGAN will take tough
stances to try to bolster his political support. Internationally, he will
refuse to cooperate with US authorities if Halkbank is fined, putting Turkish
state assets in the United States at risk. He could enact countersanctions on
the US, provoking an escalatory cycle. Erdogan may also expand drilling in the
eastern Mediterranean, further exposing him to European sanctions and
potentially risking military conflict with Greece.
ERDOGAN’s reaction in the
economic sphere will lead to another set of risks. As sanctions further strain
the Turkish economy, he will turn to his bag of unorthodox economic tools and
dig an even deeper hole. ERDOGAN will
use unconventional means to defend the currency, which will backfire and hurt
investor confidence. The president is inclined to order state-owned banks to
intervene in the market with sales of foreign currencies, and Turkey will face
a significant risk of capital controls this year.
ERDOGAN will maintain high
levels of repression at home to undermine the strength of rival political
parties and cooperation between them. That in turn will prompt harsher
sanctions and further political and economic instability. Turkey gets worse before it gets better.
*********************************
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brasileira, em especial à LEI-LAI
– LEI DE ACESSO À INFORMAÇÃO nº 12.257, de 18nov2011 e o MARCO CIVIL DA
INTERNET, Lei nº 12.965, de 23 de abril de 2014.
[3] A eventual republicação de matérias de sites e blogs que
vedam a retransmissão de suas publicações deve ser considerada como ato
proativo não doloso de desobediência civil (tipo Soft Wikileak) em favor da TRANSPARÊNCIA
TOTAL e das BOAS PRÁTICAS para aprimorar a democracia na comunicação privada e
pública, no espírito e com base na LEI-LAI, visando apenas ampliar o universo
de internautas que buscam informações gratuitas, inteligíveis e confiáveis na
rede mundial.
[4] Para usuários de correio eletrônico - e-mail, Facebook e
blog: O Emitente desta mensagem é responsável pelas opiniões de sua autoria,
mas não se responsabiliza pelo conteúdo elaborado por terceiros, embora tenha
agido com zelo e descortino na seleção de textos e imagens que reproduz nas
mídias citadas, evitando propagar fakes e informações injuriosas ou ilegais.
Cabe ao Destinatário cuidar quanto ao tratamento e destino adequados da
mensagem recebida, respeitando sempre as normas do marco regulatório brasileiro
da internet. Caso a pessoa que recebeu esta mensagem não seja o Destinatário de
fato da mesma, solicitamos devolvê-la ao Remetente e apagá-la posteriormente.
Agradecemos a compreensão e a colaboração de todos quanto ao uso correto, ético
e civilizado das mensagens e documentos tramitados por meios eletrônicos.
RONALD DE ALMEIDA SILVA
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 02jun1947; reside em São Luís, MA,
Brasil desde 1976.
Arquiteto Urbanista FAU-UFRJ 1972 / Registro profissional
CAU-BR A.107.150-5
e-mail: ronald.arquiteto@gmail.com
Blog Ronald.Arquiteto (ronalddealmeidasilva.blogspot.com)
Facebook ronaldealmeida.silva.1
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